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1. INTRODUCTION  
In this paper we study the impact of political instability on stock market return and its volatility 
in Bangladesh.  We use political strike as an indicator of political instability which characterizes 
the confrontational political landscape in Bangladesh. Political strike, locally known as ‘hartal’, 
is a political protest generally carried out by the opposition political parties to enforce their 
demand by disrupting vehicular movement on road and shutting down shops and businesses. 
At times, political strikes become very violent with huge toll on property and human lives.1 This 
political strike offers a unique setup to study the impact of political violence and instability on 
economic outcomes such as firm productivity (Ashraf, et al. 2015), cost (Shonchoy and Tsubota, 
2015) and export (Ahsan and Iqbal, 2017). Unlike the existing studies, we examine the effect of 
strike on financial side of the economy- the stock market return and volatility - using Dhaka 
Stock Exchange daily trading data of firms for the period 2005-2015. 
The understanding of the impact of political violence and unrest on stock market outcomes is of 
particular interest largely because of three reasons. First, stock market captures the perception 
of the general investors about the growth of the firms as well as the economy.  That is, stock 
return and volatility contain information on how general public as well market perceive the 
effect of political strike on the firms and economy. Second, political instability in a country 
generally dampens future economic outlook. Optimism about future is one of the key factors 
that drive stock prices up and leads people investing in the stock market. Political strikes which 
signal both current and future political and economic uncertainty have the potential to make a 
dent in the optimism of the investors. The impact of political strike on stock market outcomes 
thus can also capture the extent to which political strike affects the future outlook of the 
economy. Third, political uncertainty is argued to increase the riskiness of investment in stock 
market (Gulen and Ion, 2015; Beaulieu, Cosset, and Essaddam, 2005; Aggarwal, Inclan and Leal, 
1999). Thus, political strike offers an interesting setting to study the impact of political 
uncertainty on the volatility of stock return, particularly due to its recurrent nature.   
                                                          
1 http://archive.thedailystar.net/beta2/tag/hartal-violences/ 
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In this study we matched daily security level stock market data with political strike data. We 
use political strike data collected by Ahsan and Iqbal (2017) which collects information from 
daily newspapers on the date of occurrence of political strike, announcement date, length of 
strike, political parties that announced the strike, stated reasons for strike, and number of death 
and injuries during strike. The daily stock market data is compiled from Dhaka Stock Exchange. 
We collect daily closing price, number of trade, volume of trade and market capitalization for 
each stock. This richness of this dataset also allows us to explore how impact varies with 
heterogeneity of firms as well as political strikes.  
Understanding of the impact on firm heterogeneity is important because all firms may not be 
affected uniformly by political strike. The market fundamental of the firms may not be affected 
unvaryingly by political strikes. Manufacturing sector involving supply chain may be affected 
more than the firms involved in providing financial services such as banks and insurance 
companies. Even within the manufacturing and service sectors, some firms are more likely to be 
affected directly than other firms, depending on the product/service they produce as well as the 
location of the firms. Ahsan and Iqbal (2015) highlights the fact that the impact of strike on 
manufacturing firm such as RMG works largely through transportation phase. It indicates that 
the companies which are directly involved in transportation business are hard hit by strike such 
as firms involved in transport sector Further, there are firms for which transportation phase 
constitutes is a major part of their supply chain and these firms are highly vulnerable to strike. 
These types of firms include movers, courier service (private postal service), etc. For other firms 
which are not directly involved in transportation sector, strike may still increase the overall 
transportation cost and reduce the profit margin for all firms depending on their exposure to 
the strike. Therefore, the drop in firm’s profit and earning per share may vary substantially due 
to strike which may be reflected by the decline in stock prices.  
In our benchmark regression specifications for stock return, we use daily, weekly, monthly and 
yearly returns as our dependent variables. While in case of daily return our variable of interest 
is whether there was a strike on that particular date, in case of stock returns in longer periods, 
we use the number of strikes in that period. We control for a host of time fixed effects and 
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trends such as day-of-the-week, month and year fixed effect as well as day-of-year trend to 
capture all kinds of seasonality that might confound our results. We also run security level fixed 
effect to control for any unobserved heterogeneity of securities that might impact their return. 
Our results show that stock market return drops significantly on the day of hartal. With all time 
fixed effects and security fixed effect, this drop of daily return is about 0.14%. Note that average 
daily return of our sample is 0.02%. The strikes are also found have impact on stock return in 
longer horizon. As the number of strikes increases in a week, the weekly return decreases by 
0.15%. Similarly, as the number of strikes in a month and in a year increases, the monthly and 
yearly returns drop by 0.11% and 0.25% respectively. 
The benchmark specifications for volatility of stock return consider weekly, monthly and yearly 
volatility. Similar to stock return, we also control for all time and security fixed effects. The 
results show that, interestingly, as the number of strikes increases in a week, month and year, 
the volatility decreases by 0.09%, 0.036% and 0.025% respectively. This results are robust to 
inclusion of a host of time fixes effects and security fixed effects. 
In order to explore the heterogeneous impact on firms/securities, we consider several cases. 
First, we group them into three sectors – finance, manufacturing and service. Second, to capture 
the differential effect of firm size, we divide the firms into two groups – above and below 
median of market capitalization and call them as large and small firms respectively.  Stocks of 
some firms are traded more than others and it has consequences on return and volatility (Girard 
and Biswas, 2007; Lee and Rui, 2002).  Hence, we define firms as high frequency firms which are 
above median and as low frequency firms which are below median. Similarly, we define high 
volume and low volume firms using the median of volume of trade per day. The regression 
results suggest that large firms are affected more from hartals compared to smaller firms. 
The rest of the paper is structured in the following way. The second section briefly review the 
relevant literature. Section three describes the sources of data and descriptive statistics. Section 
four dwells on regression models and estimation strategy. Section five describes regression 
results including basic specification and firm heterogeneity and section six draws conclusion. 
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2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
The efficient market hypothesis states that any new innovation in the market will be undated in 
the firm’s value and will be revealed in the firm’s stock prices (Fama, 1970). Since firm stock 
prices reveal the discounted present values of all expected stream of payoffs, any factor that 
may affect the firms’ future profitability, investor’s perception on the future growth potential of 
the firm, and investor’s discount value will affect the current stock price. Since firms are 
heterogeneous in terms of their exposure to political events, not all firms are expected to be 
affected in the same manner.  Firms which are exposed or affected more by political conflicts are 
expected to exhibit more volatility in their stock return. The key assumption underlying the 
forward-looking and information-aggregating nature of the stock market is that agents are 
updating their beliefs in response to any innovations in an unbiased or rational manner 
(Zussman and Zussman, 2006). Based on the efficient market hypothesis, the relationship 
between political strikes and stock market is related to several streams of literature. 
A number studies have looked into the link between political events, conflicts and violence and 
stock market outcome. However, to the best of our knowledge, only few studies established the 
causal impact of political conflicts on stock market outcome exploiting a micro-level framework. 
The closest to ours micro-empirical studies identify several factors that influence stock prices 
and volatility, including uncertainty arising from political instability, conflict related entry 
barriers, firms’ rent-seeking activities, political connection of firms, private information etc. 
(Abadie and Gardeazabal, 2003; Acemoglu, Hasan and Tahoun, 2016; Beaulieu, Cosset and 
Essaddam, 2006; Bittlingmayer,1998; Dube, Kaplan and Naidu, 2011; Guidolin and La Ferrara, 
2007; Peress, 2014; Wolfers, J., Zitzewitz, 2009; and Zussman and Zussman, 2006).  
 
Investment under uncertainty induced by political conflicts and instability is generally low. 
Beaulieu, Cosset and Essaddam(2006) provided similar evidence in the case of 1995 Quebec 
referendum in Canada, where huge uncertainty surrounding the referendum outcome on 
separation of Quebec from rest of the country was created. Stock prices of firms with large share 
in Quebec fall while those of multinationals were less affected. The later groups are not affected 
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or less affected because  they are less susceptive to pessimistic scenarios including flight of 
capital, abandonment of the Canadian currency, institution of exchange controls to curb capital 
outflows, increase in income tax to finance the independent government’s deficit, and an 
increase in the interest rate to offset the lender’s risk related to debt sharing, and   will be able to 
diversify political risk away to  be less affected by a possible Quebec independence. 
Bittlingmayer (1998) exploit political events during the transition of imperial Germany to 
Weimar as a natural experiment to show that uncertainty arising from political instability lead 
to higher stock market volatility. 
 
Investors incorporate how the political factors may influence the short-run or long-run 
profitability of the firms while optimizing their portfolio of investments. Exploiting the ceasefire 
to stop the political violence in Basque county in Spain in the nineties as a natural experiment, 
Abadie and Gardeazabal (2003) compared the stock value of firms located in Basque county to 
counterfactual firms located in other non-turbulent regions. They observed that the return from 
stocks of firms located in the Basque county increased at the beginning of the fourteen months 
long true but decreased at the end of the truce. Investors in the firm located in the Basque 
county perceived the truce as good news which is translated into higher prices for these firms’ 
stocks. The end of a political conflict does not necessarily mean good news for the stock market. 
It rather depends on how investors assess the potential change in the value of their investment 
in response to the changed scenario. In an event study based on the sudden death of a rebel 
leader in Angola, Guidolin and La Ferrara (2007) showed that the stock prices of mining 
companies with concessions in Angola were negatively affected relative to those of 
counterfactual firms, as the end of conflict siphoned-off the benefits of the incumbent firms 
from conflict generated natural entry barriers and low bargaining power of the ruling 
government.  
 
In addition, political conflict may extend the opportunities for exploiting political connections, 
which may directly affect investors expected profit.  Beliefs about expected profitability are then 
reflected in future stock prices. Acemoglu, Hasan and Tahoun (2016) emphasized that stock 
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values are also determined by the scope of rent-seeking activities of firms capitalizing their 
connection with the political government. Utilizing the variation in intensity of political protests 
in Tahrir square during the recent political turbulence in Egypt, they showed that strong 
protests against the ruling political party reduce investors’ confidence in stocks of politically 
connected firms. Investors value the credible private information on the prospective gain of 
firms’ value from change in political power, as has been evident in the high abnormal stock 
return of partially nationalized multinational companies in response to several US backed coup-
authorization though such authorization is supposed to be classified as top-secret (Dube, 
Kaplan and Naidu, 2011). 
Few studies attempted to capture the impact of probable war news in the media on the financial 
market variables including stock prices (Wolfers, J., Zitzewitz, 2009; Rigobon and Sack, 2005; 
Amihud and Wohl, 2004).  The stock prices were more negatively affected with the intensity of 
war-risk related news, where intensity means how strong the likelihood of the war is.  
Exploiting the data on market trading in contracts tied to the ouster of Saddam Hussein that 
actually reveals market participants’ perception about the probability of the Iraq war, Wolfers, 
J., Zitzewitz (2009) showed that a 10% increase in the probability of war was accompanied by a 
1.5% decline in the S&P500 prices. While evaluating the effectiveness of Israel’s 
counterterrorism policies, Zussman and Zussman (2006) showed that the assassination of 
Palestinian senior military leaders exerts a significant positive impact on both Tel Aviv stock 
prices but almost no impact in the case of assassination of a junior military leaders. The findings 
is explained by how the investors actually perceive the assassination events-the former type of 
assassination boosts investors’ confidence in the success of the counterterrorism policy while 
the later does not.  
Media, both electronic and print, has strong influence to propagate the innovation in political 
information into stock market behavior. While emphasizing the role of media in determining 
stock market outcome, Peress (2014) reported that newspaper strikes in several European 
countries did not affect the stock prices on the strike days but reduced trading volume and 
volatility of stock returns in a significant manner. The main reason of low trade volume is lower 
participation by traders as newspaper strikes deter dissemination of business related 
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information. Note that their finding of reduced stock market volatility is in contrast to many 
other studies that showed heightened stock volatility in response to political events (Jianping 
and Guo, 2009; Bittlingmayer, 1998; Kim and Mei, 2001). They attribute the fall in volatility to 
reduced trading volume at extreme prices which is probably because of reduced participation of 
noise trader who are less prone to follow fundamentals of stock values. 
Although our extensive literature search could not trace any study on the relationship between 
stock market and political strikes in Bangladesh, we identify three studies that empirically 
investigated how political conflicts affect manufacturing firms’ productivity(Shonchoy and 
Tsubota, 2016; Ashraf et al., 2015) and exports(Iqbal and Ahsan, 2016). In fact, impact of political 
conflicts on stock market can be transmitted through production channel. Political conflict can 
affect production activity through several micro mechanisms including a distorted input supply 
for efficient functioning of the firms (Collier et al. 2003; Blattman and Miguel 2010, Shonchoy 
and Tsubota, 2016, Amodio and Maio, 2017). As a source of market imperfection, political 
violence can disrupt input supply for production process by limiting firms’ access to labor 
supply due to increased workers absence, access to capital due to heightened level of insecurity 
in the lender-borrower relationship, access to foreign inputs due to uncertainty regarding the 
sustainability and scope of trading relationship (Macchiavello and Morjaria 2015). Another 
specific source of disruption for production system may come from distorted transportation 
system (Ahsan and Iqbal, 2016; Ashraf et al., 2015).  
Note that all of these channels may shrink firm’s profitability due to increased cost of 
production and will be revealed in stock market. Exploiting firm level export data from 
Bangladesh, Ahsan and Iqbal (2016) found that political strikes exert a negative impact on the 
probability of firm’s export shipments on the day of strike but no cumulative impacts could be 
identified in a eight day window. However, their study found evidence that such political 
strikes can distort input supply and output delivery system by increasing transportation costs, 
for example, the cost of transporting goods to port increased by 69%. Similar qualitative 
findings on the input supply distortion in the readymade garments sector of Bangladesh during 
political strikes is reported by Ashraf et al (2015).  
9 
 
Shonchoy and Tsubota (2016) also used firm-level manufacturing data from Bangladesh to 
estimate a flexible cost function, and reported that firms productivity decreases and cost of 
production increases due to political strikes as firms do not systematically re-optimize input 
choices to adapt to uncertainty generated by such political shocks. None of the above three 
studies in Bangladesh found evidence of heightened workers absenteeism during the political 
strikes and thus rule out the channel of labour shortage affecting production. Amodio and Maio 
(2017) reports that during the second Intifada in the occupied Palestinian territories, seventy 
percent of the fall in firm output can be attributed to inefficient substitution of locally produced 
materials for foreign materials due to distortion in accessibility to imported inputs, reduced 
bargaining power with input suppliers. In fact, political strikes is also related to the literature 
that showed empirically how external shocks could affect firms’ productivity and efficient input 
use(Advaryu et al. 2016, Alcott et al. 2016). However, in contrast to the natural shocks, political 
strikes are recurrent and thus not surprising to the market players which suggest that impacts 
of political strikes on financial markets may be less intense. Because political strikes are pre-
announced, firms and investors often get enough time to adapt and adjust their belief and 
update the information.  
 
3. DATA   
We compile daily stock market data for all listed securities from Dhaka Stock Exchange on the 
following variables: closing price of the day, number of trade, volume of trade and total number 
of shares issued by the firm for the period 2005-2015. Note that the closing price is the 
unadjusted price; that is, it does not consider stock split, cash and stock dividend. The political 
strike data is taken from Ahsan and Iqbal (2016). This dataset have information on the date the 
strike actually occurred, the date of announcement, the name of the political party/non-political 
organization calling the strike, stated reasons for calling strike and the number of people of 
killed and injured during strike. Since this dataset covers the period of 2005-2012, we update 
this dataset to include 2013-15 in our study.  The richness of these both dataset allows us to pair 
them at the daily level to study the impact of strike on capital market variables.  
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We calculate continuously compounded return using log of the closing price. In case of daily 
return we take two consecutive days. Return on Sunday is calculated using closing price of 
Thursday and Sunday. Weekly return considers the difference between closing prices of two 
consecutive Thursday. In case of monthly and yearly return we consider the difference between 
the first days of months and first days of years respectively.  
We report descriptive statistics for full sample as well as sub-samples in Table1. Since there was 
a bubble and a subsequent crash in 2009-10, we report the descriptive statistics separately for 
this period. We also split the sample into two periods – period before crash (2005-08) and after 
crash (2011-15). The daily return for the full sample is about 0.02%. During the period of bubble 
and crash, average daily return was about 0.04%. Interestingly, the market saw negative return 
(-0.04%) for the period 2005-08, right before the bubble was formed. However, right after the 
crash, the average daily return increased by about five folds from its pre-crash period to about 
0.10%. Weekly and monthly returns follow the same patterns. Average yearly return for the full 
sample is about 8.27%. In the bubble-crash period, it shot up to about 16.27%. Yearly return was 
exorbitantly high for the period 2011-2015, which was about 36.13%. 
The stock market was highly volatile in our sample period. The weekly volatility is about 9.77% 
whereas the average weekly return was only 0.15%. Similarly, volatility of yearly return is about 
75.61%, against 8.27% of yearly return. Interestingly, the volatility during bubble-crash period 
was very similar to the full sample. It was about 74.29%. However, the volatility increased 
during the post-crash period of high return.  
We plot incidence of hartal by year, month, week of a day and day of a month (Figure 1). Most 
of the hartals occurred in 2013-2015. Of 144 hartals in our sample, this period saw about 76% of 
them. 2015 alone had 61 days of hartal. Note that there was no hartal during the period 2007-
2010. This was the period when the military backed caretaker government was in power.  
We observe strong seasonal pattern. About 65% hartals occurred in winter during November-
February.  Political activities in Bangladesh, such as rallies, demonstrations, blockades, hartals, 
etc. take place in winter which offers favorable weather for such outdoor activities unlike in 
monsoon.  Incidence of hartal is mostly spread out evenly across all week-days (Sunday- 
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Thursday), though there were a few on weekends (Friday and Saturday). However, we observe 
that Sunday and Thursday are slightly more likely to have hartal than other week days. Since 
Friday and Saturday are weekly holidays, in order to maximize the impact of hartal, political 
parties prefer to call hartal on Thursday or on Sunday, or on both days as it stretches the length 
of shutting down of businesses. Though there is no robust pattern of occurrence of hartal on a 
specific date of a month, the second half of the month is likely to see slightly fewer hartal than 
the first half. 
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics 
 
Full sample Full sample without 
2009-2010 (stock 
market bubble and 
crash) 
2005-2008 2011-2015 
2005-2015 
Average daily Return 0.02 0.04 -0.04 0.10 
Average weekly return 0.15 0.28 -0.26 0.66 
Average monthly return 0.61 1.11 -1.33 2.85 
Average yearly return 8.27 16.23 -13.81 36.13 
SD of weekly return 9.77 9.51 7.04 10.89 
SD of monthly return 20.16 19.55 15.26 21.94 
SD of yearly return 75.61 74.29 49.70 80.91 
Average volume of trade per 
dealing day 
968.35 958.99 197.33 1525.98 
Average number of trade per 
dealing day 
1.72 1.44 0.66 2.01 
Market capitalization per 
security 
35511625.27 36886265.21 NA 33480570.05 
Average number of securities 203.60 202.24 179.93 222.82 
 
We also want to check if there is any seasonal pattern in stock return. Figures 1a-1d also plot 
returns by years, months of a year, days of a month, and days of a week. There is a strong day-
of-a-week effect of stock return. While average daily return for full sample is about .02%, it is 
about 0.4% on Sunday and about 0.15 on Monday (Figure 1c). For all other days, the average 
daily returns are negative. In case of day of a month, the first week of a month stands out. There 
is a sharp increase in return during 3rd to 5th day of the month (Figure 1d).  
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Figure 1: Frequency of strike in a period and stock return 
Figure 1a: Number of hartal in a year and 
yearly return 
Figure 1b: Number of hartal in a month and 
monthly return 
  
Figure 1c: Number of hartal on a day of week 
and weekly return 
Figure 1d: Number of hartal on a day of a 
month and daily return 
  
 
 
4. ESTIMATION STRATEGIES  
4.1. Regression model 
It is important to clarify at the outset of the study that the purpose of this study is not to model 
the behavior of stock return using market model, factor model or any simple constant mean 
return model2. The objective is to isolate the impact of political strike on capital market 
variables. The benchmark specifications are: 
                                                          
2 See ?? for a survey paper on different types of models that explain the behavior of stock returns. 
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Impact on Stock Return  
𝑅𝑑𝑖𝑡 =  𝛼1 + 𝛽𝐻𝑡 + 𝛾𝜑𝑑
𝑦 + 𝜃𝑖 + 𝜃𝑑
𝑤 + 𝜃𝑚 + 𝜃𝑦 + 𝜖𝑖𝑡                         [daily]……………….  (1)  
where 𝑅𝑖𝑡
𝑑  is the firm/security,3 𝑖’s daily return.  𝐻𝑡 is a binary variable which assumes one if 
there was a strike on day 𝑡 and zero otherwise. Thus, 𝛽 captures the contemporaneous effect of 
strike in this case. 𝜃𝑖 are security fixed-effects which capture the unobserved, time-invariant 
characteristics of firms/securities  that are correlated with both stock return and strike.  We also 
include a day-of-year trend (𝜑𝑑
𝑦
) in our regression model to capture any seasonal pattern of the 
stock returns.  For instance, trading pattern of DSE might exhibit strong seasonal patterns.  We 
also control for day-of-week fixed effects (𝜃𝑑
𝑤) to capture any systematic variations of returns 
during a week.  We further include month fixed effects (𝜃𝑚) and year fixed effect (𝜃𝑦) to further 
control for low frequency seasonal patterns.  𝜖𝑖𝑡 is the error term. 
In case of weekly and monthly return 𝐻𝑡 is defined as the number of political strikes in a week 
and in a month, respectively. However, the set of seasonal controls for weekly return will be 
different from the monthly one. Our weekly and monthly specifications are:  
𝑅𝑖𝑡
𝑤 =  𝛼1 + 𝛽𝐻𝑡 + 𝛾𝜑𝑤
𝑦 + 𝜃𝑖 + 𝜃𝑚 + 𝜃𝑦 + 𝜖𝑖𝑡                                 [weekly]………………..…(2) 
𝑅𝑖𝑡
𝑚 =  𝛼1 + 𝛽𝐻𝑡 + 𝛾𝜑𝑚
𝑦 + 𝜃𝑖 + 𝜃𝑦 + 𝜖𝑖𝑡                                          [monthly]………………… (3) 
𝑅𝑖𝑡
𝑦 =  𝛼1 + 𝛽𝐻𝑡 + 𝛾𝜑𝑚
𝑦 + 𝜃𝑖 + 𝜖𝑖𝑡                                                    [yearly] ……………………(4) 
where 𝜑𝑤
𝑦
 and 𝜑𝑚
𝑦
 are week-of-year and month-of-year trend. 
Impact on volatility of return  
𝜎𝑖𝑡
𝑤 =  𝛼1 + 𝛽𝐻𝑡 + 𝛾𝜑𝑤
𝑦 + 𝜃𝑖 + 𝜃𝑚 + 𝜃𝑦 + 𝜖𝑖𝑡                                 [weekly]………………..…(5) 
𝜎𝑖𝑡
𝑚 =  𝛼1 + 𝛽𝐻𝑡 + 𝛾𝜑𝑚
𝑦 + 𝜃𝑖 + 𝜃𝑦 + 𝜖𝑖𝑡                                          [monthly]…………………(6) 
𝜎𝑖𝑡
𝑦 =  𝛼1 + 𝛽𝐻𝑡 + 𝛾𝜑𝑚
𝑦 + 𝜃𝑖 + 𝜖𝑖𝑡                                                    [ yearly] ………………… (7)                 
                                                          
3 A number of financial products such as mutual funds are listed in Dhaka Stock Exchange. Since these 
are not firms, we use the term security in general. However, throughout the paper, we use security and 
firm interchangeably.  
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where 𝜎𝑤𝑖𝑡, 𝜎
𝑚
𝑖𝑡 and 𝜎
𝑦
𝑖𝑡 are weekly, monthly and yearly volatility. 
We use robust standard errors that are clustered at the firm level. 
4.2.  Econometric Issues 
Our identification strategy involves ruling out three scenario. First, it could be the case that both 
the stock market and the decision to call a strike respond to a common factor such as an 
economic shock. While stock market tends to respond to economic shocks, the announcement of 
strike due to economic reasons is not common in Bangladesh. In fact, the political strike 
database of Ahsan and Iqbal (2016) has information on the official reasons for calling strike. We 
categorize these reasons into 7 groups in Figure A1 in the appendix. It shows that the electoral 
reform has been the most common reasons for calling political strike. Only about 4% of strikes 
were called for economic reasons. That is, out of 144 strikes in our sample, only 6 were related 
to economic causes. Therefore, we can safely rule out the case that a third factor is driving both 
announcement of strike and stock price movement. 
Second, both the strike and greater stock price movement may have propensity to occur during 
the same period, though solely for different reasons.  In order to draw causal inference, we have 
to make sure that we are not picking up this effect. To probe this, we plot monthly average of 
daily stock return and number of political strike by months. Figure 1b shows strong indication 
seasonality in political strike data, as discussed in section 3 – about 64 percentage of strike 
occurred during the winter in the months from November to February. The average stock 
return in a month tends to hover around 2% throughout the year with high degree of 
fluctuations, except for last two months – November and December. These last two months of 
the year saw steep increase in returns. The occurrence of greater number of strikes in winter can 
also be coincided with higher stock return, due to completely different reasons. Economic 
activitie4s tend to pick up in favorable weather in winter and the same congenial weather 
prompts political parties to call hartal during this time. 
Literature also suggest that there is a day-of-week effect of stock price movement (Fama, 1965; 
French, 1980; Keim and Stambaugh, 1984; Jaff, Westerfield, and Ma, 1989, Kato, 1990). While 
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there is no rigorous literature on this issue on Bangladesh, we examine this issue by plotting 
stock return and occurrence of strike on a day of a week (Figure 1c). The figure shows that while 
all week days (Sunday-Thursday) are more or less equally likely to see a strike, there is a subtle 
pattern. The average number of strikes decline gradually from 50 hartal on Sunday to 40 haral 
on Wednesday. The number again increased on Thursday. On the other hand, the stock returns 
exhibits strong day-of-week pattern. The first two days observe significantly higher stock 
returns than the other days of the week and returns also gradually decrease till Tuesday. 
Therefore, if we do not control for day-of-week effect, the coefficients in regressions may pick 
up spurious correlations. Therefore, in order to isolate the effect of seasonality, we use a host of 
fixed effects capturing the effect of month, day-of-week and year. We also include day-of-year 
trend in the regression model. 
Third, some unobserved characteristics of the DSE-listed companies/securities may be 
correlated with the political strikes, particularly with the exposure to strike. That is, there might 
be exposure heterogeneity across listed companies. Companies in different locations may be 
exposed to different intensities of treatment (strike) and this may lead to identification problem 
in our case. In order to capture this heterogeneity we use firm-fixed effects, assuming that this 
treatment exposure heterogeneity does not change with time.  
5. REGRESSION RESULTS   
5.1. Regression Results: Benchmark Specification  
The estimates of the specification for daily return, equation 1, are reported in table 2. The 
coefficient of hartal dummy, 𝛽 in equation 1, turns out to be consistently negative and 
statistically significant, thus suggesting a negative association between hartals and daily return 
on stock. In the simplest specification where no controls for time variant factors are included, 
column 1, variation in daily return across trading days within a security  reveal that average 
daily return is 0.08% lower on a hartal day compared to an otherwise normal day. Column 2 to 5 
gradually includes additional controls for time variant factors.  Column 5 controls for all sorts of 
time-variant confounding factors that may exhibit pattern by day-of-week, day-of-year, month-
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of-the-year, and years. Estimates from the most restricted specification suggest that, average 
daily return from stocks on a hartal day is 0.14% lower compared to a non-hartal day. 
Table 2: Impact of hartal on daily stock return (Dependent variable: Daily stock return) 
 1 2 3 4 5 
Hartal dummy -0.081*** -0.097*** -0.112*** -0.146*** -0.139*** 
 (0.009) (0.009) (0.010) (0.011) (0.011) 
Day-of-year trend  YES YES YES YES 
Day-of-week fixed effect   YES YES YES 
Month of the year fixed 
effect 
   YES YES 
Year fixed effect     YES 
Security fixed effect YES YES YES YES YES 
Constant 0.027*** -0.045*** -0.070*** -0.068*** -0.080*** 
 (0.001) (0.004) (0.006) (0.009) (0.012) 
R-square 0.000 0.000 0.003 0.003 0.004 
N 1407263 1407263 1407263 1407263 1407263 
Note: Hartal is a dummy variable assuming 1 if the day was either a strike or blockade day or 0 otherwise. Standard 
errors, where relevant, are reported in the parentheses.  
 
Table 3 reports the estimates for weekly, monthly and yearly stock return. In contrast to table 2, 
here impact of hartal is captured by including “number of hartal days” as the key explanatory 
variable in the model.  For each of the return types, column 2 contains estimates from the most 
restricted specification with all sorts of controls for time-variant factors. We will interpret 
estimates from the restricted cases only.  In all restricted specifications across return types, the 
estimates turn out to be consistently negative and statistically significant at less than one 
percent level. There is consistent evidence that hartal negatively affects the stock prices. The 
estimates for weekly return suggest that one additional day of hartal in the week shrinks 
average weekly return by 0.15%. One additional day of hartal in a month reduces the average 
monthly return by 0.11%. The impacts of hartal on monthly return is smaller in magnitude 
compared to impacts on weekly return estimates, which is probably because of the larger time 
horizon for stocks to rebound in the former case.  
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Table 3: Impact of Hartal on Weekly, Monthly and Yearly Stock Returns 
Dependent Variable Weekly Return Monthly Return Yearly Return 
 1 2 1 2 1 2 
Number of Hartal in a week -0.02 -0.15***     
 (0.011) (0.015)     
Number of Hartal in a 
Month 
  0.002 -0.11***   
   (0.013) (0.017)   
Number of Hartal in a Year     0.014 -0.25*** 
     (0.028) (0.036) 
Week of the year fixed 
effect 
NO YES NO NO NO NO 
Month fixed effect NO YES NO YES NO NO 
Year fixed effect NO YES NO YES NO NO 
Security fixed effect YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Year trend NO NO NO NO NO YES 
Constant 0.16*** -0.15 0.61*** -2.31*** 7.95*** -16.91*** 
 (0.005) (0.101) (0.024) (0.302) (0.661) (1.779) 
N 200753 200753 45933 45933 3698 3698 
r2 0.000 0.028 0.000 0.060 0.000 0.026 
Note: Standard errors are clustered at the security level and are reported in the parentheses. 
The impact of hartals on average stock return turns out to be larger in the case of yearly return- 
one additional day of hartal in the year reduces average yearly stock return by 0.25%. However, 
we are conservative while interpreting the yearly estimates.  Note that the control for time-
variant confounding factors is weakest in the cases of yearly return, which only contains a 
yearly linear trend. Since the key explanatory variable “number of hartals in year” varies by 
year, the time fixed effects are excluded from the yearly stock return mode.   
The benchmark specifications for volatility of stock return consider weekly, monthly and yearly 
volatility. Similar to stock return, we also control for all time and security fixed effects.  There is 
consistent evidence that hartal is negatively associated with volatility of stock return. The 
results, as reported in Table 4, show that as the number of hartal days increases in a week, 
month, and year, the volatility of stock return decreases by 0.09%, 0.036% and 0.025% 
respectively. Similar to the case for average return on stocks, the magnitude of hartals’ impact 
on volatility is larger for weekly return compared to that of monthly return. Following the same 
argument as presented above, we are reluctant to interpret the volatility estimates obtained for 
yearly return.   
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Table 4: Impact of Hartal on Weekly, Monthly and Yearly volatility of stock returns 
Dependent Variable Weekly Volatility Monthly Volatility Yearly Volatility 
 1 2 1 2 1 2 
Number of Hartal in a week -0.119*** -0.090***     
 
(0.005) (0.005)     
Number of Hartal in a Month   -0.056*** -0.036***   
   (0.002) (0.002)   
Number of Hartal in a Year     -0.024*** -0.025*** 
     (0.001) (0.001) 
Week of the year fixed effect NO YES NO NO NO NO 
Month fixed effect NO YES NO YES NO NO 
Year fixed effect NO YES NO YES NO NO 
Security fixed effect YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Year trend NO NO NO NO NO YES 
Constant 1.807*** 1.954*** 2.157*** 2.192*** 3.137*** 3.071*** 
 (0.002) (0.067) (0.004) (0.086) (0.023) (0.089) 
N 200753 200753 45933 45933 3698 3698 
R square 0.002 0.041 0.006 0.058 0.058 0.058 
Note: Standard errors are clustered at the security level and are reported in the parentheses.  
Our findings of drop in volatility of stock return in response to rising number of hartals is in 
contrast to literature that mostly suggests that stock market volatility increases during political 
uncertainty and instability (Bittlingmayer, 1998). However, it is consistent with the recent 
findings of Peress (2014). The explanation lies in the possibilities that on hartal days, stock prices 
move in synch, trading volume decreases significantly, and noise traders, who trade at extreme 
prices and increase market dispersion, participate less.  The first two factors are testable in our 
settings. If hartal restricts the movements of traders by interrupted public transport system and 
vehicle movement, the trade frequency is more likely to drop on a hartal day, and so does the 
participation of noise traders. 
 
5.2.  Firm Heterogeneity and Political Strike  
5.3. First, we categorize the firms according to their sector. We define three broad sectors – 
financial, manufacturing and service. Dhaka Stock Exchange classify all securities in 21 
categories. We then group these 21 categories into the following three broad sectors. Before 
turning to regressions, we first document the descriptive statistics of these three sectoral 
groups (Table 6). Interestingly, average daily return of financial sector is much higher than 
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Table 5: Broad sectoral groups of securities 
Financial   Manufacturing  Service  
Bank Tannery  Telecom 
Life insurance  Ceramic IT 
General insurance  Pharmaceuticals Service and real estate 
NBFI food  Paper and printing  
Mutual Fund  Jute Travel and leisure  
Bond  Textile 
 
 
Engineering 
 
 
Cement 
 Miscellaneous 
 Fuel and Energy  
 
other two sectors. In fact, it is negative for the manufacturing sector. The daily returns are about 
0.06%, -0.0001% and 0.003% for financial, manufacturing and service sectors respectively. It 
turns out that the average daily return for all securities in our sample period is largely driven by 
high returns of the financial sector. However, volatility of stock returns do not vary much across 
sectors. While the average weekly volatility for full sample is about 9.8%, it is 11.6% for financial 
sectors. The return turns out much higher compared to risk for the financial sector, when we 
compare the financial sector with other sectors or all securities. 
We also group the firms by their size, frequency of trade and volume of trade. If the market 
capitalization is above the median, we call them large firms and small firms if it is below 
median. 
Table 7 shows that average daily return is about three times higher for large firms than the 
small ones (0.03% vs. 0.01%). Again, note that the average daily return for the full sample is 
0.02%.  Similarly, weekly, monthly and yearly returns are also higher for large firms in more or 
less similar magnitude than the small firms. Yearly return is worth reiterating: average yearly 
return for large firms is about 13.23% whereas it is only 4.56% for small firms. Interestingly, 
there is hardly any differences in volatility between large and small firms. In case of weekly 
return, volatility for large firms is about 9.87% and 9.70% for small firms. The volatility for full 
20 
 
sample is about 9.77%. It is puzzling that volatility is uniform across size of firms while the 
return is much higher for large firms.  
Table 6: Descriptive statistics by sectors 
  Financial   Manufacturing   Service 
Average daily Return  0.0608687 -0.0001841 0.0034056 
Average weekly return  0.4280044 -0.0020235 0.0223084 
Average monthly return  1.748196 -0.0097263 0.0946105 
Average yearly return  23.92712 -0.0536653 0.6924348 
SD of weekly return  11.60335 8.801337 7.246658 
SD of monthly return  23.75148 18.22427 15.50636 
SD of yearly return  90.51221 66.14603 54.82944 
Average volume of trade per day 1034.718826 911.8897428 983.3989601 
Average number of trade per day 1.613940729 1.807461677 1.778085002 
Market capitalization per security  27934493.38 33663326.59 121050526.6 
Average number of securities  218.726 194.2767 187.525 
 
Similar to size of firms, we divide the firms into high and low groups by their frequency of 
trade – ‘high’ if frequency of trade is above median and ‘low’ if it is below median. Firms whose 
securities are traded more frequently experience higher stock return. The return for high 
frequency firms is about 0.0475% and 0.0086% for low frequency firms. In case of yearly return, 
high and low frequency firms enjoy about 18% and 3.5% returns respectively. That is, high 
frequency firms enjoy about 8 times higher return than low frequency firms. Like market 
capitalization, weekly and monthly volatility is found to be similar for both high and low 
frequency firms, though yearly volatility is slightly higher for high frequency firms. Therefore, 
in this case also, higher return for high frequency firms is not coupled with high risk.  
Volume of trade is defined as price times the number of shares traded. We define high and low 
firms using median as the cut-off points. In this case also, as expected, return is about 8 times 
higher for high firms than the low firms. Volatility has also been found to vary little across these 
two types. However, it is important to note that there is a high degree of correlation among 
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these three groups. High frequency and high volume firms are more likely to be large firms 
(Table 7).  
Table 7: Descriptive statistics by firm size, frequency and volume of trade 
  Market capitalization  Frequency of trade  Volume of trade  
  Large Small  High  Low  High  Low  
Average daily Return  0.034 0.012 0.048 0.009 0.046 0.006 
Average weekly return  0.236 0.084 0.331 0.059 0.322 0.042 
Average monthly 
return  
0.940 0.359 1.349 0.243 1.325 0.165 
Average yearly return  13.235 4.565 18.054 3.517 17.646 2.622 
SD of weekly return  9.868 9.699 10.524 9.378 10.208 9.491 
SD of monthly return  20.388 19.988 21.832 19.278 21.309 19.409 
SD of yearly return  75.95 75.16 80.15 72.85 76.40 74.58 
Average volume of 
trade per day 
126998.84 9145.51 334024.29 5044.71 274085.38 3240.21 
Average number of 
trade per day 
372.720 45.530 503.660 32.360 372.720 23.660 
Market capitalization 
per security  
5380000000 556000000 4220000000 600000000 3040000000 542000000 
Average number of 
securities  
200.240 186.690 214.130 178.110 213.940 172.730 
 
Table 8 reports the estimates of impact of hartals on average return by heterogeneity of the 
firms. Overall, the results suggest that large firms are affected more from hartals. The impact on 
weekly return does not vary by firm size, where firm size is defined by market capitalization 
per security: average weekly return is around 0.15% lower for an additional day of hartal in a 
week for both types of firms. However for average monthly return, the absolute magnitude of 
the impact of hartal is 3.8 percentage points larger for firms with higher market capitalization 
compared to those with lower market capitalization. Following the similar argument in the 
baseline specifications, we are not interpreting the yearly returns here.  
In contrast to the case of market capitalization per security, firms exhibiting higher frequency of 
trade are affected more from an additional day of hartal relative to firms with lower frequency 
of trade. This turns out to be the case for both weekly and monthly stock return. The impact for 
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high frequency trading firms is twice as large as that for the less frequently trading firms (0.11% 
vs. 0.22% for weekly return and 0.09% vs. 0.16% for monthly return).  The findings are similar 
when we group the firms by volume of trade. Because of hartal, firms with high trading volume 
are twice more affected to those with low trading volume, though the magnitude of the impact 
is a bit smaller in the case of monthly return (0.10% vs. 0.21% for weekly return and 0.09% vs. 
0.15%  for monthly return).   
Table 8: Impact of hartal on stock return by Size of firms 
  
Market 
capitalization 
Frequency of trade  Volume of trade 
  Low High Low High Low High 
Weekly Return 
Number of Hartal in a Week -0.148*** -0.147*** -0.111*** -0.216*** -0.102*** -0.210*** 
             (0.020) (0.023) (0.019) (0.023) (0.021) (0.021) 
Constant 0.091 -0.616***    -0.023 -0.801*** -0.101 -0.561*** 
             (0.137) (0.142) (0.120) (0.161) (0.124) (0.154) 
N            114796 85957 134548 66205 124140 76613 
R square 0.034 0.025 0.028 0.033 0.031 0.029 
Monthly Return 
Number of Hartal in a Month -0.095*** -0.128*** -0.086*** -0.159*** -0.089*** -0.146*** 
             (0.020) (0.028) (0.023) (0.023) (0.025) (0.021) 
Constant -1.702*** -3.655*** -2.359*** -3.653*** -2.528*** -3.194*** 
             (0.350) (0.521) (0.311) (0.666) (0.315) (0.643) 
N            26272 19661 30795 15138 28414 17519 
R square 0.071 0.055 0.060 0.068 0.067 0.058 
Yearly Return 
Number of Hartal in a Year -0.098* -0.453*** -0.131** -0.506*** -0.133** -0.441*** 
             (0.044) (0.056) (0.042) (0.061) (0.046) (0.054) 
Constant -15.64*** -19.65*** -16.27*** -23.21*** -18.45*** -18.05*** 
             (1.922) (3.210) (1.969) (3.267) (2.021) (3.152) 
N            2118 1580 2489 1209 2308 1390 
R square 0.016 0.048 0.018 0.053 0.021 0.042 
Note: Low means firms falling below median and high means firms in the above median. The weekly regression 
specifications include a bunch of fixed effects for week of the year, month of the year, year and securities. The 
monthly regression specifications include a bunch of fixed effects for month of the year, year and securities. The 
yearly regression specifications include fixed effects for securities and year trends. Standard errors are included in 
the parentheses. 
5.3 Strike Heterogeneity: Does Impact Vary With the Type of Hartal? 
Hartal can be of various forms, strikes and blockade, and can vary by the intensity of violence 
and protests, and types of restriction imposed on regular economic activities. For illustration, 
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blockades often put restriction on vehicle movements whereas strikes additionally interrupt 
other economic and business activity. Because of such differences, we split the estimates 
reported in Table 2 by the type of hartal. Table 9 presents estimates for the cases where hartal 
dummy assumes only general strikes while Table 10 presents those only for blockades. The 
estimates for strikes are in general consistent with those reported in Table 2, though larger in 
magnitude. In the most restricted specification with all possible sorts of control, as reported in 
column 5, average daily return on stocks are 0.19% larger on strike days compared to no-strike 
days. The impact is almost five percentage points larger compared to that reported in Table 2. 
In contrast to the cases for strike, the impacts of blockades on stock return are less consistent 
across specifications and relatively smaller in magnitude. The coefficient of blockade dummy in 
the most restricted specification, as reported in column 5, suggests that average return on a 
strike day relative to an otherwise normal day is 0.034% lower. Comparison of estimates across 
hartal type suggests that impact of strikes is six times larger from those of blockades. Thus, the 
impact of hartal on average daily stock return is mainly driven by strikes. This is consistent 
given that strikes contains restriction of blockades, and the former imposes both a direct and 
indirect disruption on trading activities in the stock exchange and production activities of the 
firms.  
Table 9: Impact of Strike on daily stock return (Dependent variable: Daily stock return) 
 1 2 3 4 5 
Hartal dummy -0.140*** -0.147*** -0.166*** -0.178*** -0.191*** 
 (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.014) 
Day-of-year trend  YES YES YES YES 
Day-of-week fixed 
effect 
  YES YES YES 
Month fixed effect    YES YES 
Year fixed effect     YES 
Security fixed effect YES YES YES YES YES 
Constant 0.027*** -0.042*** -0.068*** -0.076*** -0.089*** 
 (0.000) (0.004) (0.006) (0.009) (0.012) 
R-square 0.000 0.000 0.003 0.003 0.004 
N 1407263 1407263 1407263 1407263 1407263 
Note: Hartal is a dummy variable assuming 1 if the day was a strike day or 0 otherwise. Standard errors are 
clustered at the security level and are reported in the parentheses.  
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Table 10: Impact of Blockade on daily stock return (Dependent variable: Daily stock return) 
 1 2 3 4 5 
Hartal dummy 0.014 -0.013 -0.020 -0.079*** -0.034** 
 (0.010) (0.010) (0.011) (0.013) (0.012) 
Day-of-year trend  YES YES YES YES 
Day-of-week fixed effect   YES YES YES 
Month fixed effect    YES YES 
Year fixed effect     YES 
Security fixed effect YES YES YES YES YES 
Constant 0.021*** -0.045*** -0.067*** -0.071*** -0.094*** 
 (0.000) (0.004) (0.006) (0.009) (0.012) 
R-square 0.000 0.000 0.003 0.003 0.004 
N 1407263 1407263 1407263 1407263 1407263 
Note: Hartal is a dummy variable assuming 1 if the day was a blockade day or 0 otherwise. Standard 
errors are clustered at the security level and are reported in the parentheses.  
6. CONCLUSION 
Repeated and long-term political unrest and instability in the form of hartal could have lasting 
impact in the securities and exchange market. Employing high frequency stock exchange data-
set of Bangladesh, this analysis sheds light on market movement and behavior due to political 
protests, how this is reflected in the daily index and price volatility. Using Dhaka Stock 
Exchange daily trading data of firms for the period 2005-2015 and controlling for a host of 
variables such as day, month, year, day-of-year trend and firm fixed effects, we find that 
political strike has a negative and statistically significant impact on stock market return. Our 
results show that, on the day of a political strike, stock market return drops about 0.14% which 
is economically sizable. This effect gets pronounced as the frequency of strike increases, based 
on week, month or year count of occurrences. Impact heterogeneity reveals that large firms are 
affected more from hartals compared to smaller firms.    
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Appendix  
Figure A1: Stated reasons for calling strike 
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